ber that medicine is an art as well as a science. The phraseology I have adopted in this discussion is not very happily linked to the care of the sick, yet we cannot ignore that much of what we do in laboratory medicine would not survive in a competitive environment. Perhaps, as we join with industry in providing our electronic salvation, we shall become more efficient despite our innate conservatism. The Economics of Innovation Innovation and Competition The economic issues raised by the search-for improved laboratory equipment are extensive, and common to the whole range of industrial research and innovation. It is important to focus on the central critical feature. At the outset, it should be recognized that a high rate of innovation means an equally rapid rate of obsolescence in either existing methods or equipment. This replacement of existing procedures and products by new improved methods and equipment represents a vital competitive process stimulating innovation. In a rapidly changing technology, every firm faces the danger that its existing products are superseded by the innovations of competitors, and markets lost either at home or abroad; there is equally the opportunity that each firm's own technical progress will give it an impressive competitive edge to dominate the market, again either at home or abroad. This competitive challenge differs markedly from the conventional concept of competition, based wholly on relative prices. The forces of competition with industrial innovation create a technological treadmill, where new products supersede the old and a firm's position rests upon its innovational efforts relative to those of its competitors. The process is best described as a form of product competition.
What are the conditions necessary for this process to operate? At the heart lies the question of finance, and the way revenue from sales of current innovation will support and stimulate further research, development and commercial exploitation of subsequent innovations.
A Case Study
The way the problem arises can be demonstrated most directly by a case study typical of current practice in the development of new laboratory equipment. The product is the Cascade Centripeter, important for the reduction of health risks in nuclear energy laboratories. Its technical performance is not directly relevant but, briefly, it consists of a cascade filter which traps contaminated particles.
The product was originated at Harwell by Hounam and Sherwood, following observations on the relative behaviour of contaminated and uncontaminated particles. The initial design and prototype development work was completed there and the work was described in a scientific paper (Hounam &Sherwood 1965). Following Harwell's long-established practice, now confirmed by Mintech policy, commercial exploitation was encouraged. The instruments for Harwell's own laboratories were produced by Bird & Tole Ltd, a small high precision engineering firm undertaking subcontracting work. The laboratory thus received its improved equipment, and here the story might have ended. However, with the publication of the paper describing the product, many enquiries were received from laboratories throughout the world. Under licence agreement, these orders were filled: the firm, for the first time, exported products to countries including France, the United States and Japan. Also, for a small part of the firm's activities, the production sequence changed. In place of one-off production, the item could be produced in batches and supplied from stock. Here is the first manifestation of integrated industrial production.
The story is interesting, not because it is especially remarkable, but because it is typical. There are many features to note. The sequence has the character of a cottage industry, rather than of a technologically based industry. There is a divorce between the research and development of the product and its production and commercial exploitation. The exploitation and marketing depends upon the customer's own initiative, which cannot guarantee saturation. Also, where should the process lead from here? Where does responsibility lie for further development to counter risks of imitation or obsolescence by second generation products? The market is highly specific, but has the technique substantial possibilities of application elsewhere in other fields or other disciplines? Is this form of arrangement adequate and sufficient to create a self-generating process of product development and improvement ? If not, what are the pre-conditions necessary for initiating such a process?
In brief, this case study represents just one step on the technological treadmill. All the questions it raises are central to the broad process of product competition. The answer to all of them, however, depends upon an adequate flow of finance for further research, development and product improvement. How far, in other words, can the products of past innovation create sufficient revenue to generate future change ?
Pricing Policies Whatever the means of finance used, whether from private or from public funds, in the long term the critical test will be the margin in prices between costs and revenue, or the net cash flow derived from profits to finance further progress. The question of pricing is, therefore, central to the effectiveness of product competition. It is possible to distinguish two basically different approaches to pricing policies for the products of industrial innovation.
The first has the direct objective of reimbursing the innovator with. the costs he has incurred. In industrial research, this is the basic principle underlying contracts where public funds are involved, and includes the wide variety of arrangements for industrial development and research. They include cost-plus, cost and incentive arrangements, target costing and so forth. They stem from traditional concepts of pricing, based on cost absorption. This form of pricing is common throughout much of British industry, particularly in engineering. Its widespread practice is, perhaps, a hangover from the war years, where cost absorption was the basis of price control adopted by government agencies.
The alternative is to treat prices not simply as a means of recouping past costs, but as a central feature of a growth strategy of the firm. The level of prices, given a constant or captive market, determines the revenue flow not only to recoup past costs but also to finance growth, particularly a continuous programme directed to the development and exploitation of new products. This shifts the approach to prices away from the traditional basis of past cost absorption, to concentrate on setting prices acceptable in the market representing the value of the commodity to the user. This approach is illustrated by the pricing strategies of the newer science-based industries, particularly in chemicals, where investment in industrial research, development and marketing and the rate of innovation have rapidly increased in recent decades.
The difference between the two approaches may be slight in theory, but in practice has a significant effect on the prices paid for new products by their users. A new instrument might, for example, save the work, or double the output, of five technicians. This represents the value of the product to the user, irrespective of costs incurred by the producer. Setting costs at values to the user presupposes an appreciation of cost effectiveness in the laboratory. This pricing strategy could stimulate a growth in awareness of cost effectiveness and direct future innovation into areas with greatest cost benefit. In the short term, the largest part of the saving would accrue to the innovating firm as a source of funds for future research. In the long term, when even later products can provide these funds, the savings accrue totally to the user.
Cost Absorption
Both approaches to pricing the products of innovation are concerned with a common problem. By definition, a new product is unique or embodies unique features, otherwise it cannot rank as innovation. A unique product, given patent or other form of market protection as well as significant technological time lapse before imitation is possible, holds a monopoly position. Given this situation, what is the right price level, since the normal workings of price competition are absent?
Confronted with this question, particularly where public money is involved, a pricing strategy based on cost absorption has the main objective of solving the traditional economic concern in monopolysituations, namelycontrol over the level of profits. The main objective of such a strategy is to ensure that profits earned are reasonable and approximate to the level which would exist had price competition been present.
This has theoretical respectability as it reflects the traditional model of the market and price mechanism. Where the market forces are absent, the object of the monopoly control is to ensure that returns and profitability conform to what would have been achieved had the forces been active. There is, however, a basic difficulty here.
The traditional model of the market rests on an assumption of constant technology: it is a static model which treats technical change as exogenous, as something occurring outside the industrial structure and thus at little or no cost. It requires, however, little more than casual observation to see that technical change, left out in theory as a residual, explains a large, if not the major, part of economic and industrial growth. The traditional notions of price competition explain little of the workings of an industry in a state of technical change.
However, quite apart from the theoretical implications of pricing based on cost absorption, it must be accepted that the attempt to control profitability has a direct appeal to common sense. High profitability is usually associated with consumer exploitation, and the protection it affords is generally regarded as the feather bed for inefficiency. But the attempt to control profits begs the question of what in fact constitutes a reasonable level. The current convention is to relate profits to real capital employed, and to accept average returns for industry as a whole as the measure of reasonableness. But is the return on capital employed a valid measure of a firm's performance? Real capital employed is derived from balance sheet figures, covering what might loosely be defined as fixed capital investment. In other words, profits are related to the book value of the buildings, the plant and equipment, and the company's fixures and fittings. But, particularly with a science-based industry, expenditure cannot be arbitrarily labelled capital or current. Clearly expenditure on research and development is a principal capital asset of a science-based firm, but this does not rank as part of its capital employed. There are strong grounds for arguing that conventional methods of judging profitability, particularly for firms undertaking industrial research, are unsound and call into doubt the validity of pricing orientated towards cost absorption as a means of stimulating industrial innovation.
Revenue Flowfor Research A change in the attitude towards pricing and profits is perhaps critical in stimulating a greater rate of industrial research and product improvement. A strategy where the market is priced at levels reflecting the value of the product to the user, rather than at levels absorbing costs already incurred, may provide the source of finance necessary to ensure that research and development is a continuous function of the firm, that new products are fully exploited on the national and international market, and that firms can measure up to the challenges of product competition.
The starting point for exploring this strategy is the same as that underlying the question of cost absorption. An original innovation is by definition unique. It is not, therefore, vulnerable in the short term to price competition. So long as the price reflects the value of the product to the user in excess of costs incurred, the product would generate a substantial revenue flow for the innovating firm. The limits of this revenue flow are set by the size of the market, which in turn reflects the technical value of the product and its uniqueness compared to existing products. The revenue flow leaves a substantial surplus for plough-back to support further research, development and marketing.
It is probably true that an innovating firm, acting under the discipline of product competition, has exceptional and variable needs of working and fixed capital. For successful innovation and its rapid exploitation, a firm must grow rapidly in all dimensions. This inevitably places a strain upon financial resources, particularly in the small private company. Since it is attempting to innovate and to exploit its innovations, it is highly unlikely that the firm can rely upon traditional sources of finance. The shortage of risk capital for innovation is a recurring theme in economic discussions of science in industry. Whilst stock issues may be readily taken up and loans easily raised in the money market for low risk or routine planned investment, funds for industrial research, the outcome of which in product terms is uncertain and which is thus highly speculative, could be attracted only at very high rates of interest. A substantial net cash flow, derived from a surplus of revenue over current expenditure, is thus perhaps the main source a firm must look to if it is to engage in a continuous and growing process of industrial innovation.
The main criticism which might be levelled at this position is that there is no guarantee that a firm would invest substantial profits from a protected market in future research. However, although a firm might be protected from price competition through the uniqueness of its products or from patent or other forms of market control, it still faces the risks of product competition. Much of the history of industrial innovation has been one of the dramatic emergence of a single new discipline or product which dominates the scene for a while, but which is rapidly matched and frequently superseded by later developments. Technical change has perhaps in the past been the most effective means of undermining antisocial monopoly. A firm making a substantial surplus of revenue over expenditure through control over the market is not isolated from competition. It faces the risks of product competition, where the technical merits of different products determine market shares. It must, therefore, invest continuously in research if it seeks to maintain its position.
It is clear that product competition is the direct result of research activities of an innovating firm's competitors, which in turn is a reflection of their own research expenditure. Their research, too, in the long term must also be linked to returns from sales and the profit margin in prices. Thus the general level of prices, profits and the rate of competitive innovation throughout the industry are intimately linked.
To summarize, prices set at levels reflecting the value of any new product to the user are the key to the rate of industrial innovation. The surplus net cash flow represents the major source of funds for a continuous and expanding research and development programme. The risks of obsolescence through the actions of competitors in developing similar or more effective second generation products is the stimulus to a continuation and expansion of this investment. A firm's competitors following a similar strategy are all equally vulnerable and affected by the actions of the initial innovating firm. Through the treadmill of product competition, given a pricing strategy which not merely seeks to recoup or absorb past costs, but reflects the value of the product to the user, a self-generating process of industrial innovation and development can be stimulated. Medicine and the Challenge of Technology I have chosen to treat the subject of medicine and the challenge of technology initially from a philosophical point of view. The challenges appear to me to fall under six major headings.
First, we have the challenge to our sense of proportion. The fact that something becomes techno'61gically possible does not mean that it is necessarily desirable, and we must somehow or other learn to pick and choose how and where to apply technology, whether in pathology or in medicine in general.
Secondly, we face the challenge to our humanity. Even if the application of technology results in some operation being performed more efficiently, or more cheaply, it is bad technology if it leads to a major distortion of human motivation or the way in which people like to be treated. Technology should not run us, we should use it for our benefit. This means that the good designer and the good administrator must not be satisfied merely by a machine which works, but only by one which is also correctly matched into its human environment.
The third challenge is to our educational system. There is no point in having a population which contains individuals capable of designing clever machines if facilities are not provided at the same time to train people to operate them, to look after them and to understand them. If, as is almost always the case, the new machines also provide data about a patient which have not previously been available, then the decision makers, be they doctors, nulses or pathologists, must understand the significance of the information; otherwise the effect may be confusing rather than beneficial.
The fourth challenge is to our business acumen. Instrument development is costly and is only justified if the market develops. What technology may be able to achieve often anticipates the expressed wishes of the 'customer'. The wise manufacturer in my opinion not only fulfils recognized market requirements but spends some of his energies quite ethically in creating the market for the next generation of equipment. Conversely, the minority desire must be recognized as such, and the manufacturer must harden his heart and not spend his precious risk capital and resources acting on the advice of the enthusiastic but isolated individual.
Fifthly, there is the challenge to academic research organizations. I do not want to add to the endless argument about the relative merits of pure and applied research. However, in a situation where money and other resources are scarce, the decision to pursue a particular line of research to the exclusion of another is very akin to an investment decision in the realm of business. The advantage of the business man is that the success or failure of his decisions can be measured by the profitability of his organization. No such unequivocal scale exists to measure the 'profit' of research work. Nevertheless, I believe that there is room in the organization of research work for some management strategy, that people can be trained in management technique without damaging their scientific integrity, and that this would benefit the conduct of research work and its exploitation.
Lastly, we face the challenge of how we actually manage society. All of us would probably be prepared to admit grudgingly that, taking the longer view, there is no real limit to what technology can achieve, provided enough effort and investment is channelled into a particular area. How do we then arrange our priorities and make our decisions when these give us the power of life or death over an individual? How do we balance the claims of an individual who may be kept alive by enough investment against the claims of a group who may
